CS 5110/6110 – Rigorous System Design | Spring 2017 Jan-12

#### Lecture 1 Course Overview & Introduction

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## **Course Overview**

- Instructor: Zvonimir Rakamarić
- Teaching assistant: Shaobo He
- Course page is on Canvas
- Main goals
  - Gain solid understanding of basic theory and practice behind proving correctness of systems (mainly programs)
  - Cover advanced topics (interpolants, dealing with concurrency) in second part of the course
- Textbook: The Calculus of Computation by Aaron R. Bradley and Zohar Manna
  - Electronic version is free through SpringerLink

## **Topics**

- Propositional logic and SAT
- First-order logic and SMT
- Verification conditions
  - Weakest precondition
- Proving program correctness
  - Pre- and post-conditions
  - Loop invariants
- Symbolic and concolic execution
- Advanced topics
  - Analyzing concurrent programs

## **Course Organization**

- Lectures
  - Discuss basic and advanced verification topics
  - Emphasize on lasting foundations and theory
  - Reading research papers
- Homework assignments
  - Hands-on exercises accompanying presented material
  - Some coding required in your programming language of choice
- Projects
  - Focused, practical exploration of a topic related to software verification (and ideally your interests!)

## **Course Communication**

- Leverage Canvas
  - Post questions
  - Discuss concerns
  - Ask for help and clarifications
  - Message myself and Shaobo
- Office hours published on canvas
- Email: <u>zvonimir@cs.utah.edu</u>
  - Private questions (e.g., questions related to your grade)

# Grading

- 50% homework assignments
  - 5-6 practical homework assignments
    - More than last year
  - Each assignment is worth the same
- ▶ 50% course project
  - Project proposal (10 points)
  - Final presentation (30 points)
  - Final report (50 points)
  - Peer review (10 points)
- 5110 students are graded differently (see course syllabus)

## **Course Projects**

- Mini research projects
  - Publishing a (workshop) paper is the ultimate goal
- Deadlines still not defined
  - I will update the webpage by the end of this week
- I will also come up with a list of potential topics

#### Team work

- Allowed (up to 2 students)
- You have to do twice as much work
- If it is not clearly specified who did how much work, both students will get the same grade

## **Collaboration vs Cheating**

- Discussing homework and project solutions at high-level is fine and encouraged
- Basing your code/write-up on any other code/write-up is cheating
  - b do not copy solutions from another student
  - b do not copy solutions from the internet
  - b do not even look at solutions from another student
  - b do not ask for solutions on online forums
- Acknowledge appropriately any outside materials you used or rely on

Collaboration vs Cheating cont.

- I will officially report instances of cheating
  - I will request that you fail this class
  - If confirmed, cheating will be on your record with this department
- Ignorance is not a valid excuse
  - Read our policies on cheating
  - Talk to professors if you are still not sure

## **Typical Cheating Scenario I**

Part of a student report copied from Wikipedia

In the context of hardware and software systems, formal verification is the act of proving or disproving the correctness of intended algorithms underlying a system with respect to a certain formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics.

## **Typical Cheating Scenario II**

In the context of hardware and software systems, formal verification is the act of proving or disproving the correctness of intended algorithms underlying a system with respect to a certain formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics [1].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal\_verification

## **Typical Cheating Scenario III**

Wikipedia defines formal verification as follows [1]:

"In the context of hardware and software systems, formal verification is the act of proving or disproving the correctness of intended algorithms underlying a system with respect to a certain formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics."

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal\_verification

## **Typical Cheating Scenario IV**

Formal verification encompasses tools and techniques for proving correctness of complex systems [1].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal\_verification

## Late Policy

 Late homework assignments and project deliverables will not be accepted unless you contact me before the deadline and have a good excuse

#### Discussion

Where can software be found nowadays?

Any bad software bugs you heard about?

### Introduction to Software Verification

- Software is everywhere
  - Personal computers, mobile phones, in cars, ATMs, banks, planes, space shuttles, hospitals...
- Software has errors
  - Software systems are generally large, complex, and prone to errors...
  - And getting larger and more complex...
    - Multi-cores and many-cores
  - …and more error prone!

## Infamous Software Bugs

- 1962: Mariner I space probe
- 1982: Soviet gas pipeline
- 1985-87: Therac-25 medical accelerator
- 1988: Berkeley Unix finger daemon
- 1988-96: Kerberos Random Number Generator
- 1990: AT&T Network Outage
- 1993: Intel Pentium floating point divide
- 1995-96: The Ping of Death
- 1996: Ariane 5 Rocket
- 2000: Cancer institute's therapy planning software

#### **Therac-25 Medical Accelerator**

- Radiation therapy machine produced by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL)
- Bug: Race condition (concurrency error) between concurrent tasks in the Therac-25 software
  - Massive overdoses of radiation
- Between 1985-87 at least five patients die; others are seriously injured

## **Therapy Planning Software**

- November 2000, National Cancer Institute, Panama City
  - Therapy planning software miscalculates the proper dosage of radiation for patients undergoing radiation therapy
- At least 8 patients die, another 20 receive overdoses likely to cause significant health problems

## Ariane 5 Rocket

- June 4, 1996: Ariane 5
   Flight 501 crash
- Working code for the Ariane 4 rocket is reused in the Ariane 5



- Ariane 5's faster engines trigger an overflow condition in an arithmetic routine inside the rocket's flight computer
- Flight computer crashes
  - The rocket explodes 40 seconds after launch

## **Automotive Industry**

http://www.embedded.com/columns/embeddedpulse/179100752


- 2001: 52,000 Jeeps recalled due to a software error that can shut down the instrument cluster.
- 2002: BMW recalls the 745i since the fuel pump would shut off if the tank was less than 1/3 full.
- 2003: A BMW trapped a Thai politician when the computer crashed. The door locks, windows, A/C and more were inoperable. Responders smashed the windshield to get him out.

### Automotive Industry cont.

- 2004: Pontiac recalls the Grand Prix since the software didn't understand leap years. 2004 was a leap year.
- 2005: Toyota recalls 75,000 Prius hybrids due to a software defect
  - Cars stall or shut down while driving at highway speeds
  - Owners advised to bring their cars into dealers for an hour-long software upgrade
- > 2010: Toyota recalls 300,000 Prius cars
  - Software bug?

## Code Red Worm

 2001: Code Red worm attacks the Index Server ISAPI Extension in Microsoft Internet Information Services



- Exploit used: Buffer overflow bug
- Worm released on July 13
- The number of infected hosts reached 359,000 on July 19
- Estimated damages are \$2.6 billion

### **Motivation**

- Software errors are costly
  - US Natl. Inst. of Standards & Technology (NIST): Software errors cost the US economy alone an estimated \$60 billion each year
- Improving software quality and reliability is a major software engineering concern
- 2016 NIST Report to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy titled "Dramatically Reducing Software Vulnerabilities"
  - Software verification is prominently featured

# Testing

Quality assurance relies heavily on testing

Pros

- Scalable, precise (no false bugs)
- Easy to adopt and understand
- Testing (even random) does find lots of bugs

### Cons

- Time consuming and costly
  - Writing (good) test cases
  - Tester:Developer ratio at Microsoft around 1:1
- Coverage
  - Important bugs still escape

## Simple Testing Example

foo(???);

#### void foo(int x) {

- •••
- •••

- . .
  - foo(INT\_MAX);
  - foo(INT\_MIN);
  - foo(0);

.......

- foo(random());
- foo(random());
- foo(random());

#### **Example Where Testing Works**

```
void foo(int x) {
    if (x == 0) {
        BUG!
    }
```

#### **Example Where Testing Fails**

```
void foo(int x) {
    if (x == 914) {
        BUG!
    }
```

### **Formal Software Verification**

Definition from Wikipedia:

"Statically proving or disproving the correctness of a program with respect to a certain formal specification or property using formal methods of mathematics."

Could be a very effective way to deal with the software reliability problem


## **Brief History**

- Turing, "Checking a Large Routine", 1949.
  - We need proofs of programs
  - Mentions modularity
  - Early attempt at a general proof method
- Floyd, "Assigning Meaning to Programs", 1967.
  Workable proof method
- Hoare, "An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming", 1969.
  - Further formalized
- Dijkstra, "A Discipline of Programming", 1976.
  - Further formalized

## Why Formal Verification?

- Static (or source code) analysis
  - Doesn't execute code, no test cases
  - High coverage
    - Explores all possible paths through code
  - Finds more hard bugs
- Lower costs and turn-around time
- No silver bullet
  - Undecidable in general
    - Either misses bugs or returns false errors
  - Scalability and precision

#### **Basic Verifier Architecture**



## Some Industry Success Stories

#### Microsoft

- SLAM device drivers
- Pex automatic unit testing of .NET
- Code Contracts contracts for .NET
- SAGE whitebox fuzzing for security
- Startups
  - Coverity, Polyspace, Fortify...
- Astree project in France
  - Used by Airbus
- Verified software efforts
  - NICTA's secure microkernel
  - Microsoft Hypervisor

## SAGE

- Finding security bugs using whitebox fuzzing
- Security bugs are expensive (MSR report)
  - Cost of each serious security bug: \$Millions
  - Cost due to worms: \$Billions
- Running on 100s machines 24/7
- Fuzzing 100s of applications
  - Media players, image processors, file decoders, document parsers...
- Finding 100s of security bugs
  - Saves tons of money/time/energy

### SAGE cont.

"Every second Tuesday of every month, also known as "Patch Tuesday," Microsoft releases a list of security bulletins and associated security patches to be deployed on hundreds of millions of machines worldwide. Each security bulletin costs Microsoft and its users millions of dollars. If a monthly security update costs you \$0.001 (one tenth of one cent) in just electricity or loss of productivity, then this number multiplied by a billion people is \$1 million. Of course, if malware were spreading on your machine, possibly leaking some of your private data, then that might cost you much more than \$0.001. This is why we strongly encourage you to apply those pesky security updates."

## Verification and Microbrewing ③

 Deschutes Brewery uses SAGE-based software testing service to find bugs in their automation software:

https://www.microsoft.com/en-

us/research/video/osisoft-deschutes-brewery-usedproject-springfield-full/

## Summary

- Software has bugs
- Bugs can be very expensive
- Catch easy bugs with testing, etc.
- Use software verification techniques to catch hard bugs
- Understanding basics of software verification will be a requirement for future software engineers

## **Next Lecture**

- Propositional logic
- SAT solvers